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TICK TOCK: WHEN DOES THE THIRTY-DAY
CLOCK IN RULE 4003(B) BEGIN?
MAEGHAN J. MCLOUGHLIN†
INTRODUCTION
An individual debtor files for bankruptcy. The debtor then
files a list of his assets that he claims as exempt from the estate.
The exempted assets will be protected from liquidation; the nonexempt assets will be converted into cash and distributed to
creditors. The requisite meeting of creditors is held to determine
if the claimed exemptions are proper under the applicable
statutory provisions. No conclusion is reached. The presiding
trustee1 adjourns the meeting to an unspecified future date.
Subsequently, the debtor crashes his car, an asset he claimed as
exempt. Who owns the car? Who suffers the loss?
Exemptions play a vital role in chapter 7 consumer
bankruptcies because the exempted assets serve as the bedrock
for the debtor’s new life after discharge from bankruptcy. The
debtor’s goal of maximizing exemptions to facilitate the postbankruptcy “fresh start”2 is rivaled by the creditor’s objective of
maximizing the estate for a larger recovery in the pro rata asset
distribution.3 The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) and Federal Rules
†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Fairfield University. I would like to thank
Professor Keith Sharfman for his help and guidance and my father, Patrick
McLoughlin, for his inspiration and wisdom, my mother, Paula McLoughlin, for
always believing in me, and my sister, Molly McLoughlin, for her spirit.
1
In most instances, the meeting is presided over by the United States trustee,
who then delegates that task to the trustee handling the case if the creditors wish to
elect a trustee. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.02[4] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
2
The “fresh start” is a creature of congressional policy that enables the honest
but unfortunate debtor a new opportunity in life, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt. See In re Ramlow, 417 B.R. 479, 481 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2009); Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 535
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
3
See Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 480 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (stating that the
goal of bankruptcy process is to obtain a maximum equitable distribution for
creditors and to ensure a fresh start for individual debtors); In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25,
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of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rules”) strike a balance in this
perennial conflict by requiring the debtor to file a list of claimed
exemptions and providing the trustee and creditors the
opportunity to object within a set time.4 However, attempts to
efficiently resolve cases and restore equilibrium between debtors
and creditors have been endangered by a practice that both
manipulates and undermines the deadlines set out in the Code
and Rules.
Section 522(l) of the Code and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 4003(b) govern the process through which a debtor
claims exemptions and parties in interest, namely the trustee
and creditors, may object to the claimed objections.5 Section
522(l) requires the debtor to file a list of property claimed as
exempt and states that if no objection is timely filed, “the
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”6 Rule
4003(b) establishes the deadline for objections, providing that “a
party in interest may file an objection to the list of property
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of creditors
held under § 341(a) is concluded.”7
The § 341 meeting of
creditors8 is held to bring the debtor’s financial affairs to light
and allows the trustee and creditors to assess the validity of the
claimed exemptions.9 The creditor’s meeting cannot always be
completed at one time, however; accordingly, trustees have
adopted the practice of adjourning the meeting indefinitely,
thereby preventing the thirty-day deadline for objections from
32 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000) (pointing out that bankruptcy law simultaneously
pursues two contradictory goals: it seeks to provide a distribution to creditors by
liquidating debtor’s property, but at the same time, it also seeks to give debtor a
“fresh start” through the bankruptcy discharge and by allowing debtor to keep
property from creditors through exemptions); In re Campbell, 124 B.R. 462, 464
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (explaining that the basic objective of bankruptcy law is twofold: to achieve just and equitable distribution of assets to creditors and to relieve
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, thereby giving debtor a “fresh
start”).
4
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l) (West 2011); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1).
5
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a)–(b).
6
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l).
7
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). The Rule further provides that the “court may,
for cause, extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to object expires, a
party in interest files a request for an extension.” Id.
8
See 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). This meeting is colloquially called “the section 341
meeting” or “the 341 meeting of creditors.” See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][c]; see also, e.g., In re Campbell, 124 B.R. at 464.
9
See 11 U.S.C. § 341; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1,
¶ 341.02[5][d].
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ever starting.10 These indefinite adjournments have exacerbated
uncertainty over claimed exemptions and have thwarted the
shared goal of expeditious administration of cases.
Trustees are empowered, pursuant to Rule 2003(e), to
adjourn the meeting “from time to time by announcement at the
meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written
notice.”11 Several courts have interpreted Rule 2003(e) to permit
open-ended adjournments without announcement of the
adjourned date and time.12 Courts have also allowed the trustee
to end meetings without concluding or adjourning them; thus
leaving the question of whether the thirty-day deadline began a
mystery. These practices increase delay, prevent an expeditious
resolution, and render the thirty-day deadline in Rule 4003(b)
meaningless—a result the Court and Congress could not have
intended when promulgating and enacting the Rules.
A circuit split has emerged on the issue of when the creditors
meeting is deemed concluded for purposes of starting the thirtyday clock if no formal announcement of a continuation date is
made at the meeting.13 The Ninth Circuit adheres to the “bright
line” approach, requiring the trustee to announce a specific date
and time for the new 341 meeting of creditors within thirty days
of the last meeting.14 If the trustee fails to do so, the meeting is
deemed concluded.15 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit employs the
“case-by-case” approach, which considers the facts of each case to
determine whether a 341 meeting of creditors was either
adjourned or concluded.16 The conflicting approaches result in
the debtor’s uncertainty regarding post-bankruptcy retention of
property and creditors’ confusion over the timeframe to object in
hopes of maximizing the estate.
This Note surveys the competing approaches to the thirtyday limitation and its impact on the rights of both debtors and
creditors. It concludes with a proposed solution derived from the

10

See, e.g., Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2008).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e).
12
See, e.g., In re Flynn, 200 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
13
Prior to this circuit split, the Supreme Court strictly construed the thirty-day
deadline, barring all belated challenges to the claimed exemptions, regardless of the
validity of the exemptions. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643–44
(1992).
14
See Smith v. Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 2000).
15
Id.
16
See Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008).
11
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bright line approach but extends further to encompass the
policies inherent in the Code. Part I provides a background of
chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and the applicable Code and Rule
provisions that facilitate the estate administration. Part II
reviews the conflicting case law and differing interpretations
regarding the conclusion of the 341 meeting of creditors. Part III
examines the policies, interpretations, and equitable
considerations underlying Rule 4003(b). Part III then proposes
that Rule 4003(b) be revised to provide that unless the trustee,
for cause, announces the future date and time of the adjourned
meeting at the 341 meeting of creditors, the thirty-day period
begins as of the last date of the creditors meeting. Part III
concludes by detailing the practical concerns associated with
indefinite adjournments and demonstrates that the proposed
solution accords with the values animating the Code and Rules.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Historical Treatment of Rule 4003(b) and Its Predecessors

The history of exemptions in bankruptcy law has developed
to ensure that the debtor receives a prompt, efficient, and
comprehensive determination of any exemption dispute. The
first two federal bankruptcy statutes, the Acts of 180017 and
1841,18 allowed debtors a modest set of exemptions, such as
necessary furniture and wearing apparel. The third federal
bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, added to
exemption laws by promulgating procedural rules requiring the
trustee to report to the court within twenty days of receiving the
debtor’s list of exemptions.19 The 1867 Act established the two
enduring themes of requiring the trustee to determine the
debtor’s exemptions within a short period of time and requiring
objections to be promptly submitted to the court for resolution.
General Order 17,20 promulgated under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898,21 tightened the deadlines governing the trustee’s

17

Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (repealed 1803).
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843).
19
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 523 (repealed 1878).
20
General Orders in Bankruptcy 17(2) (1898), reprinted in 4B COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1534 (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978).
21
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 11 U.S.C. § 24, amended by
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
18
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determination, valuation, and distribution to the debtor of the
exempt property, giving the trustee five days to make a report to
the court.22 Former Rule 403, the predecessor to the current Rule
4003, superseded General Order 17 and allowed the trustee
fifteen days to object to the debtor’s report of exemptions.23 If no
objections were filed within fifteen days, the report was deemed
approved by the court.24 Former Rule 403(e) thus introduced the
concept of automatic allowance of exemptions and further
expedited the process of administering estates.
After Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Rule
4003 was promulgated, giving any party in interest thirty days to
object after the meeting of creditors concluded.25 Together, Rule
4003 and section 522 enable the debtor to create a list of
exemptions, which is presumed valid absent objection within
thirty days.26 The rigid deadlines present throughout history for
filing objections serve the congressional purpose of determining,
at an early stage in the case, a debtor’s entitlement to exempt
property.27 Thus, the relevant history reflects a statutory scheme
designed to ensure the speedy resolution and effective
administration of a debtor’s exemption entitlements.
B.

Background of Exemption Policy

A primary goal of the bankruptcy system is to secure the
speedy and efficient administration of the estate so that assets
can be distributed to creditors.28 The Code and Rules require an
early and accurate list of the debtor’s claimed exemptions to aid
the trustee in expeditiously determining the rights of both the

22

General Orders in Bankruptcy 17(2) (1898).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 403 (repealed 1975), reprinted in 4B COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 20, at 4-27.
24
Id.
25
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
26
11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 2011).
27
See In re McCormack, 244 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000).
28
Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the property in which the debtor has a
legal or equitable interest becomes property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541; Young
v. Adler (In re Young), 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987). After filing, the debtor
may try to exempt certain property from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).
Exempt property is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate. See Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992); see also Superintendent of Ins. for the
State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2004);
Beaty v. Selinger (In re Beaty), 306 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2002).
23
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debtor and creditors.29 This goal of prompt estate administration
is paired with that of giving the debtor a fresh start, which
allows the debtor to retain certain assets fundamental to
becoming a productive member of society once again.30 Other
than the assets approved as exempt pursuant to § 522(l), all of
the debtor’s interests in property are transferred to the trustee
for distribution among the creditors.31 Typically, exemption
disputes arise from debtors’ erroneous valuation of an item or
debtors claiming as exempt an amount higher than the relevant
law permits.32 Without a properly-timed objection under Rule
4003(b), the excess value over the legal exemption amount
remains property of the debtor,33 despite the claimed exemption’s
lack of merit.34
C.

Structure and Purpose of the Individual Chapter 7
Bankruptcy

Allowing trustees an open-ended time period to determine
whether the exemptions are objectionable is contrary to the
structure and purpose of the most common consumer
bankruptcy, the chapter 7 liquidation.35 In 2007, consumer
29
See In re Starns, 52 B.R. 405, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that the purpose of
§ 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) “is to protect the rights of a debtor by requiring a prompt
determination of the right to exemptions”).
30
See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 13.08[1] (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 12A ed. 2009). This is frequently referred to as
relieving the “honest but unfortunate debtor” from the oppression of indebtedness.
See Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 200 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).
31
COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30. However,
the trustee can elect to abandon certain property if he or she determines that they
have no value to the estate. Id.
32
Id. ¶ 13.08[3][a].
33
See id. ¶ 13.08.
34
See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 633–34 (1992) (holding that a
trustee may not contest the validity of a claimed exemption under § 522 after Rule
4003(b)’s thirty-day period has expired, even though the debtor had no colorable
basis for claiming exemption); see also In re Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Rule 4003(b) acts as an absolute bar to hearing objections, whatever
the underlying merits of debtors’ exemptions and debtors’ actual knowledge of
opposition to exemptions may be); In re Ferretti, 203 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1996) (finding that an automobile accident claim was exempt, although Florida law
did not provide for exemption for accident claims, where trustee and creditors failed
to object within the thirty-day limit).
35
See Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households with
Nothing To Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 493, 500 (2006) (stating that about
seventy percent of bankrupt consumers choose chapter 7).
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chapter 7 bankruptcies lasted an average of just 124 days.36 Rule
4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline plays a vital role in the
comprehensive and fast-paced framework enacted by Congress by
promoting the expeditious resolution of consumer cases.37
Accordingly, adhering to a short deadline comports with the
statutory design for individual cases because the need for
certainty regarding exempted assets is at its zenith.38 Certainty
is vitally important in chapter 7 liquidations, as opposed to
chapter 13 reorganizations, because the non-exempt assets will
be turned over to the trustee, sold, and the proceeds will be
distributed to creditors.39 When the thirty-day deadline never
begins, debtors may be hesitant to use the questionably exempt
property because they are unsure if they even own it. A more
troubling issue arises when the debtor does use the debatably
exempt property and impairs its value while waiting for the
trustee to declare a new meeting. In this scenario, the debtor has
potentially interfered with the estate and distribution, but due to
the delay, neither party knows who will suffer the loss.
Section 522 governs the process for claiming exemptions
when filing for bankruptcy.40 “The substantive purpose of
36
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 REPORT OF STATISTICS
REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT OF 2005 STATISTICS tbl.3 (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2007/Table3.pdf;
see
also
Discharge in Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/discharge.html#when (last visited Feb. 11,
2011) (stating on the Federal Judiciary’s “Bankruptcy Basics” that “typically, [a
chapter 7 discharge is granted] about four months after the date the debtor files the
petition”).
37
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006); id. § 365(d); 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(2)(A)
(West 2011); id. § 704(b)(1)(A); id. § 704(b)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 2015(a)(1),
2003(a), 2003(e), 3002, 4004, 4007(b)–(c).
38
See 1 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 3.1 (John Rao & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 9th ed. 2009). The congressional imperatives are designed to move
cases along quickly because chapter 7 filings are by far the most frequently used
type of bankruptcy case commenced by individual debtors.
39
See In re Graham, 258 B.R. 286, 290 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that
exemptions serve a very different purpose in chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 13
because protection of assets against a forced sale is not relevant in a chapter 13
proceeding).
40
11 U.S.C.A. § 522; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.01 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). Section 522(d) lists categories of property in
varying amounts that a debtor may claim as exempt. Section 522(b) provides that
some states can prohibit their citizens from using the exemptions in § 522(d). This is
known as “opt[ing] out,” and the individual states then provide the list of exemptions
available to their citizens under applicable state law. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b).
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personal exemptions in bankruptcy is to ensure that individual
debtors will not emerge from bankruptcy completely destitute”
but rather will retain certain basic assets needed both for daily
living and a quick reentry into normal economic life.41 “Without
this kind of protection, the ‘fresh start’ that is a debtor’s primary
goal in consumer bankruptcy would, in most cases, merely be a
fresh path to new debt.”42 Section 522 specifies certain property
that the debtor is entitled to exempt and provides the monetary
Section 522(l) grants debtors
caps for such exemptions.43
property rights in the claimed exemptions by succinctly stating
that in the absence of an objection, the list of claimed exemptions
is exempt.44 The Code defers to the Rules with regard to the
timing and procedure for objecting to claims.45
The 341 meeting of creditors is the means for evaluating the
validity of the debtor’s claimed exemptions.46 In a chapter 7
filing, the trustee must convene the meeting between twenty and
forty days after the debtor files for bankruptcy.47 The purpose of
the meeting is to obtain information beyond what was listed in
the debtor’s schedules, specifically, the assets and liabilities that
exist.48 At the meeting, the trustee and creditors may question
the debtor regarding transactions involving the debtor, the
debtor’s financial state, or any other issue that could affect the
administration and settlement of the estate.49 To bring to light
any possible objections, creditors are entitled to inquire about
41

In re Long, 260 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) (citation omitted).
Id. at 861–62 (citation omitted).
43
11 U.S.C.A. § 522.
44
Id. § 522(l).
45
See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 40, ¶ 522.05[2].
46
See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30,
¶ 16.06. Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to attend the
meeting. Id. The Rules also require the individual debtor to attend the meeting in
person and submit to examination by the creditors. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(b)(1).
47
Id. 2003(a). In a chapter 7 or 11 proceeding, the meeting is to be convened
between twenty-one and forty days after the order for relief. Chapter 13 creditors
meetings are scheduled between twenty-one and fifty days after the order for relief.
Id.; see also 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 2003.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2010).
48
See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30,
¶ 16.03.
49
See id. ¶ 16.01. The questions typically asked, as well as other guidelines for
§ 341(a) meetings and administration of chapter 7 cases, can be found in U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 2-1 to 2-4 (2002) [hereinafter
TRUSTEE HANDBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/
library/chapter07/docs/7handbook0301/Ch7hb0702.pdf.
42
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concealed assets, fraudulent transfers, or grounds for
dischargeability.50 These inquiries should asses the accuracy of
the schedules containing exemptions and determine whether the
filing is an abuse of the system.51 If suspicion arises at the
meeting of creditors, the creditors may: (1) ask the trustee to
adjourn the meeting by announcing a new adjourned date in the
future or52 (2) file a request for an extension of time within thirty
days of the 341 meeting of creditors if cause exists.53 Because a
creditor can acquire the necessary financial information by other
means, such as a court-ordered examination of the debtor,54 a
maneuver to create delay “by continuing the meeting of creditors
would be unjustified and abusive.”55
Rule 4003(b) provides the method for objecting to exemptions
not allowed under § 522 and discovered in the 341 creditors
meeting.56 The primary purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to ensure that
exemption disputes are resolved early and quickly in bankruptcy
proceedings.57 The Rule provides that
a party in interest may file an objection to the list of property
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of creditors
held under § 341(a) is concluded . . . . The court may, for cause,
extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to object
expires, a party in interest files a request for an extension.58

50
See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30,
¶ 16.06[3]. In the typical consumer debtor case, creditors rarely come to the § 341
meeting because these debtors rarely have any assets of significant value. Id.
¶ 16.06[3].
51
Id. ¶ 16.03.
52
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e).
53
Id. 4003(b)(1).
54
The trustee has the additional option of requesting a Rule 2004 examination.
See id. 2004. Rule 2004(a) states that “[o]n motion of any party in interest, the court
may order the examination of any entity.” Id. An examination under Rule 2004
allows a creditor great latitude to examine the debtor about almost any issue
pertaining to the debtor’s case. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47,
¶ 2003.02[2][c].
55
In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
56
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
57
See In re McCormack, 244 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (noting that a
rigid deadline for objecting to a debtor’s claimed exemptions serves the congressional
purpose of determining a debtor’s entitlement to exempt property at an early stage
of a bankruptcy case).
58
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
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The thirty-day deadline incentivizes prompt action by the
trustee and creditors to quickly resolve any disputes over the
debtor’s listed exemptions.59 Thus, Rule 4003(b) “reflects a
[c]ongressional attempt to strike a proper balance between
providing trustees and creditors with an opportunity to object to
any exemptions they feel are contrary to their interests, while at
the same time assuring the debtor of some sense of finality.”60
Another vital purpose of the thirty-day limit is to provide the
debtor with early notice of an objection and determine whether
the listed exemption must instead be turned over to the trustee
and liquidated.61
In addition, Rule 2003(e) provides the method for adjourning
the 341 meeting of creditors when it could not be concluded in the
initial session. Specifically, the Rule states that “[t]he meeting
may be adjourned from time to time by announcement at the
meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written
notice.”62
The trustee may have various reasons for not
concluding a meeting in one session, such as a complex estate,
mistaken exemptions, or the trustee’s desire for more
investigative time.63 The creditors meeting, however, should only
be adjourned if the trustee reasonably believes that the debtor’s
financial affairs and accuracy of the listed exemptions have not
been fully investigated.64

59

See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 599 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1994).
Id.
61
See Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 630 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that the purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to provide the debtor with timely
notice that an interested party objects); In re Bush, 346 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 2006) (dismissing the objection for being untimely when the trustee timely
filed the objection but failed to send notice to the debtor within thirty days).
62
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e).
63
See Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that the thirty-day period for filing objections to debtors’ claimed
exemptions did not begin to run on the date the creditors meeting was held where
the meeting was continued because the § 341(a) purposes had not been fulfilled); see
also In re Kleinman, 172 B.R. 764, 769–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that
the meeting of creditors is not a “one shot event” and if Rule 4003(b) intended
objections to be filed within thirty days of the first date set for the § 341 meeting,
rather than after the conclusion of the first meeting, it would have said so).
64
See In re Bernard, 40 F.3d at 1031 (the trustee has the right to continue the
creditors meeting if he or she reasonably believes that the purposes of the § 341
meeting have not been fulfilled).
60
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Neither the Code nor the Rules provide a specific manner or
method to officially conclude the meeting of creditors.65 While it
is settled that objections to exemptions after the thirty-day
period has expired are prohibited,66 much confusion surrounds
the issue of when a 341 meeting actually concludes for purposes
of starting the Rule 4003(b) thirty-day clock. The problem arises
when the trustee does not announce a date and time for a future
meeting the 341 meeting. Recognizing that without a conclusion,
the deadline for objections cannot begin, trustees frequently try
to frustrate the deadline for objecting by continuing the meeting
generally without either concluding it or continuing it to a
definite date and time. The theory underlying this practice is
that there is no need to object or apply for an extension of time if
the period to object never began.
D. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,67 the Supreme Court strictly
construed and enforced Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline,
explicitly endorsing the prompt administration of the estate. The
Court in Taylor did not answer the question of when the creditors
meeting concluded68 but instead addressed the issue of whether
the trustee could object to an inappropriate exemption after the
thirty days had expired.69 There, the debtor listed potential
proceeds from a lawsuit as an exempt asset with an unknown
value.70 This listed exemption was discussed at the 341 meeting
of creditors, but the trustee declined to object because he doubted
the suit’s legitimacy.71 When the case later settled for $110,000,
the trustee demanded turnover of the funds, and the debtor
resisted because the thirty-day deadline had expired.72 Despite
the fact that the debtor had no “colorable [statutory] basis” for
the exemption under § 522, the Court held that the failure to
object to the exemption in a timely fashion barred the trustee

65

See In re Cherry, 341 B.R. 581, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992).
67
503 U.S. 638.
68
The Court in Taylor does not address this issue because the initial creditors
meeting both began and concluded in one session. See id. at 640–41.
69
Id. at 639.
70
Id. at 640.
71
Id. at 640–41.
72
Id. at 641.
66
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from later challenging the validity of the claim.73 Announcing
the significance of timeliness, the Court stated, “Deadlines may
lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and
they produce finality.”74
Notwithstanding its holding that the proceeds from the
lawsuit were exempt, the Court acknowledged that this result
might lead to perverse incentives. Specifically, debtors may try
to claim property as exempt in the hopes that the trustee or
creditors will fail to notice or object in time.75 The Court,
however, countered this argument by pointing out the various
remedies and penalties already in place to discourage debtors
from scamming the bankruptcy system.76 These include the
denial of discharge for presenting fraudulent claims,77 the
requirement that filings “be verified or contain an unsworn
declaration” of truthfulness under penalty of perjury,78 the
provision for award of sanctions for signing documents not
grounded in fact or existing case law,79 and the imposition of
criminal penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases.80
By strictly interpreting the deadlines and placing the
objecting burden on interested parties, the Court endorsed the
policy favoring expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases
over “equitable” considerations of asset distribution.81 Though
the results may be harsh for creditors, the decision is actually
consistent with the general interpretation of deadlines for taking
action in bankruptcy.82 This interpretation resonates strongly in

73

Id. at 643–44.
Id. at 644.
75
Id.; see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Procedural Exemptions and the Taylor
Legacy, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 397, 410 (1998) (stating that “[t]he more general
criticism of Taylor is that the precedential effect of the decision would be to allow
debtors to claim property as exempt, whether or not so entitled, in the hopes that the
trustee will be too busy to catch the spurious claims in time”). Ponoroff calls the
exemptions at issue in Taylor and its progeny “procedural exemptions” that debtors
have the power, though not necessarily the right, to create. Id. at 397 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Despite the lack of substantive entitlement, these
exemptions arise in bankruptcy cases due to the failure of the trustee or creditors to
object within the deadlines. Id.
76
Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644.
77
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(B) (2006).
78
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008.
79
Id. 9011(c).
80
18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
81
Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 398.
82
Id.
74
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consumer bankruptcy cases where the fresh start policy objective
is of utmost importance.83 The Court, having refused to imply a
good faith requirement on debtors for § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b)
purposes, advances the principles of finality, expeditious
administration, and the fresh start, rather than vague equitable
considerations and concerns over perverse incentives.84
The Supreme Court upheld its holding in Taylor in a recent
decision, Schwab v. Reilly.85 There, the debtor listed “business
equipment” on schedule B with an estimated market value of
$10,718 and claimed “business equipment” with a value of
$10,718 as fully exempt on schedule C.86 The debtor used
§ 522(d)(5) and (6), claiming the full statutory maximum of the
wildcard and tools of the trade exemptions as her business
equipment.87 The trustee did not object because the dollar value
the debtor assigned to her business equipment fell within the
limits prescribed by the Code.88 When the business equipment
was later found to have a value of $17,200, the trustee moved to
sell the equipment and distribute the $10,718 to the debtor.89
Relying on Taylor, the three lower courts denied the trustee’s
motion.90 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that because the
value of the debtor’s claimed exemptions fell within allowed
statutory limits, the trustee was not required to object to the
exemptions.91
The Court maintained that it is not reducing Rule
4003(b)’s governance because “[c]hallenges to the valuation
of . . . ‘exemptible assets’ are not covered by Rule 4003(b) in the
first place.”92 The Court concluded that § 522(b), as opposed to
§ 522(l), was the operative provision.93 Most of the categories of
property listed in § 522(b) define the property a debtor can claim
as exempt “as the debtor’s ‘interest’—up to a specified dollar
amount—in the assets described in the category, not as the
83

Id.
Id. at 410–11. The holding and policy implications in Taylor are particularly
relevant in chapter 7 liquidations. Id. at 398.
85
130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).
86
Id. at 2658.
87
Id. at 2657.
88
Id. at 2658.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 2659.
91
Id. at 2669.
92
Id. at 2663 n.8.
93
Id. at 2661.
84
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assets themselves.”94 By defining the exempted property as the
debtor’s interest in the property, the Court found that the trustee
had no duty to object to the property the debtor claimed as
exempt—the two interests in her business equipment—because
the stated value of each interest, and thus the “ ‘property claimed
as exempt[ ]’ was within the limits the Code allows.”95
Challenges to “property claimed as exempt” under the Code are
still subject to Rule 4003(b);96 but when the Code defines that
property as an interest with a specified dollar limit in an asset
and the debtor accurately declares the value of the asset to be
within Code limits, the trustee does not have a duty to object
within thirty days.97
The Court found that Taylor did not mandate a different
result. The Court distinguished Taylor because there, the debtor
listed an amount—“$ unknown”—that was plainly not within
Code limits, invoking the trustee’s duty to object within thirty
days. In a vigorous dissent joined by two justices, Justice
Ginsburg stated that “[i]n addition to departing from the
prevailing understanding and practice, the Court’s decision
exposes debtors to protracted uncertainty concerning their right
to retain exempt property, thereby impeding the ‘fresh start’
exemptions are designed to foster.”98
II. CONFLICTING CASE LAW SURROUNDING RULE 4003
As a result of this uncertainty, the issue of how long a
trustee may adjourn a meeting of creditors and thereby keep
open the period to object to the debtor’s claimed exemptions has
resulted in three distinct lines of cases: (1) bright line; (2) caseby-case; and (3) debtor’s burden. In the absence of a clear Rule or
section on point, each approach attempts to define what
constitutes the “conclusion” of the meeting of creditors.99

94

Id. at 2661–62 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2662.
96
Id. at 2663 n.8.
97
Id. at 2657.
98
Id. at 2670 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99
See Moyer v. Dutkiewicz (In re Dutkiewicz), 408 B.R. 103, 110 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2009). Without stating what action is necessary to conclude a meeting, the court
found that merely “expressing the possible need for further questioning or
investigation does not by itself continue the meeting.” Id.
95
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Bright Line

The bright line approach requires the trustee to announce a
specific date on which the meeting will be continued within thirty
days of the last meeting held. If the trustee does not announce
the future date and time, the meeting will be deemed concluded
on the last date it was convened.100 This approach considers the
policy underlying Rule 4003(b), “which requires that a debtor’s
exemptions become final without delay.”101 Courts applying the
bright line approach have held that Rule 2003(e) and Rule
4003(b) should not be commingled to thwart the expeditious
resolution of a case by indefinitely delaying the objection period.
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that has adopted a
bright line approach when facing an indefinite adjournment.102
In In re Smith, the trustee conducted the 341 meeting of
creditors on October 27, 1995.103 Instead of concluding the
meeting, the trustee adjourned the meeting until further
notice.104 No further notice was ever given, and eight months
later, the creditors objected to the debtor’s exemptions.105 The
Smith Court explicitly rejected the creditors’ argument that Rule
2003(e) permits a trustee to indefinitely continue a meeting of
creditors.106 Applying a plain meaning approach, the court found
that for the adjournment to be effective, it must be accompanied
by an announcement of “the adjourned date and time.”107 The
100

See Smith v. Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 476–77 (9th Cir. 2000);
Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Clark (In re Clark), 262 B.R. 508, 515 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001);
Moldo v. Blethen (In re Blethen), 259 B.R. 153, 158 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); In re
Friedlander, 284 B.R. 525, 527 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); In re Hurdle, 240 B.R. 617,
622 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1999); In re Levitt, 137 B.R. 881, 883 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
101
See In re Cherry, 341 B.R. 581, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
102
The Ninth Circuit first articulated this method in 1994 in Bernard v. Coyne
(In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028, 1031 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The objection
period . . . remains open until 30 days after . . . the trustee concludes a 341(a)
meeting without expressly continuing it to a later date . . . .” (citing FED. R. BANKR.
P. 2003(e))). The trustee, however, can only use his or her broad discretion to keep
the § 341(a) meeting open as long as there are legitimate grounds for believing that
further investigation will prove fruitful. Id.
103
235 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 2000).
104
Id. at 474. The second issue in Smith is “whether conversion of the case from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 triggers a new period within which to file objections to
property already excluded as exempt during the Chapter 11 proceeding.” Id. at 473.
The court concluded that it does not. Id.
105
Id. at 474.
106
Id. at 475–76.
107
Id. at 476; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e).
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court bluntly stated that this is the exclusive method of
adjournment permitted by Rule 2003(e).108
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, rejected the argument that
Rule 2003(e)’s “may be adjourned” is permissive and not
mandatory.109 Rather, the court held that “may” refers to the
trustee’s power to use his or her best judgment in deciding to
adjourn meetings or not.110 The court concluded that on a plain
reading of Rule 2003(e), for purposes of Rule 4003(b),
adjournment, if taken under the trustees’ discretion, “must be
accompanied ‘by announcement at the meeting of the
adjourned date and time.’ ”111 Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit
decision,112 the Smith Court held that an announcement made
after the meeting adjourns may be sufficient, but only if the
delayed announcement is made within thirty days of the last held
meeting.113 The court reasoned that requiring an announcement
within thirty days of the last meeting was consistent with the
goal of keeping the bankruptcy process moving by enforcing firm,
explicit deadlines.114
Reiterating one of bankruptcy law’s
primary objectives, the court stated that “[t]o authorize trustees
to adjourn meetings indefinitely, even when it is unlikely that
any subsequent meeting will in fact be called, would nullify the
thirty-day requirement of Rule 4003(b), rendering the holding in
Taylor hollow, and undermining the concerns . . . about
promptness and finality.”115
The Smith Court relied heavily on In re Levitt,116 which held
that Rules 2003(e) and 4003(b) should not be combined to
postpone indefinitely the date by which objections to exemptions
must be filed.117 In Levitt, the trustee held the 341 meeting of
creditors and announced the meeting would be continued

108

In re Smith, 235 F.3d at 476.
Id. at 476 n.2.
110
Id.
111
Id. (emphasis added).
112
See Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 1994).
113
In re Smith, 235 F.3d at 476.
114
Id. at 478.
115
Id. at 476. This view was reaffirmed in Moldo v. Blethen (In re Blethen), 259
B.R. 153, 156 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (finding that although the trustee has discretion
to continue the meeting, general continuances render the 4003(b) deadline
meaningless, promoting uncertainty and preventing finality).
116
137 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
117
Id. at 883.
109
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indefinitely because he wanted to investigate various issues.118
The trustee then delayed fifteen months before ultimately filing
Analyzing the
an objection to the debtor’s exemptions.119
interplay between Rules 2003(e) and 4003(b), the court found a
strong policy prohibiting the trustee from adjourning the meeting
simply to delay the date by which objections must be filed.120
Specifically, Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day requirement exhibits the
“rulemakers’ concern that the exemptions become final within a
definite and relatively short time.”121 By providing the means for
adjournment, Rule 2003(e) exhibits the legislature’s focus on
“keep[ing] the process moving.”122 Therefore, allowing a trustee
to wait over thirty days to announce the date and time for
reconvening the creditors meeting defeats the policy supporting
the bankruptcy system.123 Adhering to the thirty-day deadline
leads to finality,124 which is important not only to debtors, “who
need to get on with their lives, but also to trustees, who need to
know which assets are theirs to administer.”125
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in In re Friedlander
articulated two policy considerations underlying the bankruptcy
system which support the bright line approach.126 First, a bright
line rule provides certainty to both debtors and creditors.127 The
purpose of Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline is to allow both
debtors and creditors to accurately assess their assets and move
forward.128 In contrast, a reasonableness standard assessed on a
case-by-case basis is unworkable in reality because it is nearly
impossible to predict when a court will deem a delay
unreasonable.129 Second, the court embraced the bright line rule
to prevent undue delay.130 Just as Rule 4003(b) was enacted to
prompt action, the “spirit of Rule 2003(e) is that a deadline for

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 883 n.1.
284 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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exemptions be given in order to move the case along quickly.”131
Therefore, any approach that allows for indefinite extensions of
the creditors meeting fails to follow the spirit and purpose of the
bankruptcy laws.132
B.

Case-by-Case

A majority of courts have rejected a bright line approach,
holding instead that indefinitely adjourned 341 creditors
meetings are not necessarily concluded and therefore, do not
trigger the thirty-day deadline.133 The case-by-case approach
requires a determination in each case as to whether the trustee
acted reasonably, based on the specific circumstances in choosing
to generally continue the meeting instead of concluding it or
adjourning to a specific time. Courts using the case-by-case
method rejected the bright line approach because such a strict
rule could impede justice where a trustee needs more time and
information to fully understand the debtor’s financial affairs.134
For example, in In re Peres, the Fifth Circuit found that the
case-by-case method afforded the trustee discretion yet
restrained his ability to indefinitely postpone the next meeting of
creditors.135 Under this approach trustee’s actions are analyzed
under a reasonableness standard, which considers (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the complexity of the estate; (3) the
cooperativeness of the debtor; and (4) the existence of any
ambiguity regarding whether the trustee continued or concluded
the meeting.136
131

Id.
See id.
133
See Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
Petit v. Fessenden (In re Petit), 182 B.R. 59, 63 (D. Me. 1995) (declining to adopt a
bright line rule but instead looking to the reasonableness of delay); In re Bace, 364
B.R. 166, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding the case-by-case approach persuasive
and refusing to impose a bright line rule without advance warning); In re James, 260
B.R. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2001) (finding that although a bright line rule would
be preferable, the court must examine each case until the court adopted a local rule);
In re Brown, 221 B.R. 902, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that a case-by-case
method is best because “[t]rustees should have the discretion to perform their
duties,” however some limitation on reasonableness should apply).
134
In re Peres, 530 F.3d at 378.
135
See id.
136
Id.; see Steffen v. United States (In re Steffen), 405 B.R. 486 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
The indefinite continuation was deemed reasonable due to the complex nature of the
case and the lack of ambiguity regarding the continuance. Id. at 492. The debtor’s
lawyer did not object to the continuation, nor were the debtor’s financial affairs in
132
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In Peres, the first 341 meeting of creditors was held on June
20, 2005 and was subsequently adjourned three times.137 The
third 341 meeting of creditors took place on September 23, 2005
and was continued without an announcement of the next
meeting’s date and time.138 The meeting was ultimately held and
concluded on August 24, 2006, over eleven months after the last
341 creditors meeting.139
The court concluded that the eleven month adjournment was
reasonable because of the debtor’s own complicity in the length of
the delay.140 Specifically, the September 23rd meeting was
continued because the debtor had not provided the requisite
materials and was later continued again at the debtor’s
request.141
Moreover, there was no ambiguity as to the
continuance and thus little risk of harm to the debtor since he
was the source of the delay.142
Other courts have also applied the case-by-case analysis.
For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Williams used the
four factors from Peres to conclude that the ten month delay
resulting from the trustee’s indefinite continuance was
unreasonable and “violated the spirit” of Rule 4003(b).143 In
examining whether the delay was justified, the court looked at
the sequence of events to determine when the meeting concluded
and when the thirty-day objection period began to run.
Specifically, the court found that the reason for objecting resulted
from the debtor’s errors, made early in the case, in claiming
exemptions and providing documents.144
Moreover, these
mistakes could have been easily discovered and resolved with the
trustee’s reasonable diligence in the initial 341 meeting of

order at the meeting. Id. at 493. Therefore, because the trustee acted reasonably
under the circumstances, the meeting was not deemed “concluded” when the trustee
continued the meeting indefinitely. Id. at 492.
137
In re Peres, 530 F.3d at 376.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 378.
141
Id. The court also found that the August 2006 meeting did not require
advance written notice, despite the fact that a date of continuation was not set at the
initial meeting, because “the [d]ebtors were not prejudiced by the lack of written
notice.” Id. at 378–79.
142
Id. at 378.
143
See Logan v. Williams (In re Williams), 400 B.R. 479, 489–91 (Bankr. D. Md.
2008).
144
Id. at 489–90.
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creditors.145 Accordingly, the court found that there was no
reason why the trustee could not have filed an objection early in
the case.146 The Williams Court also held that the case was not
complex and the delay truly resulted from the trustee’s
negligence in failing to recognize that the debtor had cited an
incorrect statute for the exemption.147 The trustee, by writing
only “Meeting of Creditors Held and Disposition Pending,” failed
to continue, reschedule, or conclude the meeting, making it
impossible to divine the status of the case.148 Ultimately, the
court found that, because Rule 4003(b)’s time limits existed to
speed the administration of cases and bring closure to both
debtors and creditors, the trustee had acted unreasonably in
failing to conclude or reschedule the meeting.149
The Williams Court adopted a reasonableness rather than
bright line approach based on its interpretation of Rule
2003(e).150 The court found that in the context of Rule 2003(e),
“may” is permissive; adjourning a meeting by announcing the
date and time is not the exclusive means by which a meeting can
be continued.151 Furthermore, Rule 2003(e) is completely silent
as to a time frame for when a continued meeting needs to be
rescheduled.152 The court, however, rejected senseless general
continuances due to the ambiguity and confusion that results for
both parties.153 As the Collier treatise stated
The practice of keeping [2003(e)] meetings alive in [necessary]
cases by successive continuances has been common and has
much to commend it; it saves delay and expense in calling
creditors together to consider special matters and often makes
prompt action possible.
However, meetings of creditors should not be routinely
continued if no special circumstances warrant such action. . . .
This practice plainly violates the intention of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure that there be a deadline for trustees
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id. at 490.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 491.
150
Id. at 488.
151
Id. at 489 n.7.
152
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e); see also In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 489 n.7
(interpreting Rule 2003(e) to not require a continued meeting to be rescheduled
within thirty days).
153
In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491.
146
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and creditors to object to exemptions so that exemption issues
can be settled expeditiously.
If a trustee needs further
information in order to decide whether to object to an exemption,
the trustee should either continue the section 341 meeting to a
definite date or seek an extension of time to file objections to the
exemption.154

Therefore, the Williams Court, relying on the Collier
treatise, concluded that even though a trustee “may” adjourn the
meeting without announcing a date and time, when the propriety
of a debtor’s exemption is in question, the better practice is for
the trustee to file a motion with the bankruptcy court to extend
the objection timeframe.155 Moreover, the motion for an extended
objection period must be filed within thirty days of the conclusion
of the 341 creditors meeting, as the obvious purpose of these time
limits is to expedite case administration and provide closure for
both debtors and creditors.156
C.

Debtor’s Burden

The final approach imposes a burden on the debtor to ensure
that the meeting of creditors concluded. This line of cases holds
that the 341 creditors meeting is not concluded until the trustee
declares it to be concluded or the court so orders.157 On the one
hand, these courts have rejected imposing a strict deadline for
objecting because the Code and Rules do not provide one.158 On
the other hand, this approach is skeptical of the case-by-case
approach because relying on the trustee’s reasonableness is too
uncertain.159
For example, the bankruptcy court in In re DiGregorio found
that because “the debtor has the greatest interest in concluding
the meeting” and “trigger[ing] the 30-day objection
period[,] . . . the debtor [bears the burden] to move for a court
order concluding the § 341 [creditors] meeting.”160
The
DiGregorio Court held that while Rule 2003(e) provides for
154

3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 41.02[5][g] (emphasis added).
In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e).
156
In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491 n.8. It is somewhat ironic that the court
makes frequent reference to speedy administration of the case and emphasizes
finality yet embraces a reasonable standard that is more likely to lead to delay.
157
In re Koss, 319 B.R. 317, 321 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
158
See In re Flynn, 200 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
159
Id.
160
In re DiGregorio, 187 B.R. 273, 276 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
155
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adjournment to future certain dates, there is no authority in
either the Code or the Rules for the trustee to adjourn a 341
creditors meeting generally.161 The court, however, conceded that
in practice trustees do adjourn 341 meetings indefinitely and, in
the absence of a statutorily defined conclusion date, the meeting
can continue indefinitely, thereby preventing the commencement
of the exemption objection period in 4003(b).162 Therefore, due to
the Rules’ silence, the debtor must move to conclude the meeting,
and courts will only act if the adjournment was found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”163
More recently, the bankruptcy court in In re Koss noted the
difference between a trustee’s duty to convene a meeting and his
duty to conclude a meeting.164 The Koss Court held that Rule
4003(b) was best interpreted as not limiting continuances, and
accordingly, a 341 creditors meeting is not concluded until the
trustee declares or the court orders.165 The court encouraged
debtors who felt unduly and unnecessarily burdened by a lack of
finality to file a motion to compel conclusion.166 Further, since
Rule 2003(e) does not impose a per se deadline for the conclusion
of a 341 creditors meeting or a deadline for reconvening an
adjourned meeting, the court declined to authorize or craft one.167
III. ANALYSIS OF RULE 4003(B)
Read together, the Code and Rules, create a system where
debtors, within a short timeframe, can attain finality about their
retained assets and predict their finances more accurately
moving forward.
Construing Rule 2003(e) liberally and
preventing the Rule 4003(b) deadline from running means that a
debtor might never have the certainty of knowing whether she
may keep the property listed as exempt until the trustee decides
to object. Such a construction suggests that when a chapter 7
case has progressed to the point where the bankruptcy court may
161

Id.
Id.
163
Id. (quoting In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 196 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)); see also
In re Flynn, 200 B.R. at 484 (quoting In re DiGregorio, 187 B.R. at 276) (finding that
trustees may continue creditors meetings indefinitely and prevent commencement of
the exemption objection period).
164
319 B.R. 317, 321 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
162
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grant a discharge, individual debtors will remain clueless about
whether their home, car, clothes, tools of trade, and so on will be
objected to by the trustee. Allowing the trustee to dodge the Rule
4003(b) thirty-day deadline is logically inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Code’s detailed framework promoting a speedy
resolution in an individual’s case.168
A.

Exemption Policy: Striking a Balance

Strictly construing the Code and the Rules effectuates
congressional intent because the carefully drafted text reflects
both the policy and the goals underlying the mandate.169 The
Code contains the numerous, and often conflicting, objectives of
the consumer bankruptcy system: (1) equitably distributing
assets among creditors; (2) expeditiously and efficiently resolving
cases; (3) giving the individual debtor a fresh start; and
(4) providing both debtors and creditors with a sense of finality.170
Section 522 of the Code aims to strike a balance between these
competing values—namely the tension between maximizing
exemptions for the debtor’s benefit and maximizing the estate for
creditors’ recovery. Though the policies of asset distribution and
the fresh start are at odds, all parties desire a prompt and
effective administration of the debtor’s estate.171 Because Rule

168
See Lini, Inc. v. Schachter (In re Schachter), 214 B.R. 767, 777 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1997) (describing an artificial extension of the first meeting as a mechanism for
extending the Rule 4003(b) bar date as inconsistent with “the spirit if not the letter
of Taylor”); Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 407 (“When employed purely to extend
artificially the exemption objection period, the tactic of indefinitely continuing the
first creditors meeting is a misuse of the process that ought not be tolerated.”).
169
See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 601 (E.D. La. 1994) (“The bankruptcy
rules should be interpreted to effectuate the mandate Congress announced.”); In re
Florida, 268 B.R. 875, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (“When faced with a proper claim
of exemption, courts strictly construe § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b).”); Carlos J. Cuevas,
The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 455 (1994). See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of
the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993). Policy arguments are developed in the lower courts, so by
the time the cases reach the Supreme Court, policy justifications exist for both sides.
Id. at 538. The Court then picks the result, with its policy justifications that best
support the statutory text. Id.
170
See Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 1, 16 (2004).
171
Superintendent of Ins. for the State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Fin. Corp.),
377 F.3d 209, 216 (2d Cir. 2004); Beaty v. Selinger (In re Beaty), 306 F.3d 914, 922
(9th Cir. 2002).
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4003(b) is derived from and supports the substance of § 522,172 it
too must ensure that an equitable balance between debtor and
creditor is met.
1.

Fresh Start

The fresh start policy is a bedrock principle of consumer
bankruptcy law, and retaining exempt property facilitates the
debtor’s transition into post-bankruptcy life.173 It is axiomatic
that a primary purpose of the Code’s exemption provisions is to
foster the fresh start by permitting a debtor to retain enough
assets to stay afloat post-bankruptcy.174 Two guiding rationales
underlie the exemption process: “(1) to give the debtors a socalled ‘grub stake’ to begin their fresh start and (2) to act as a
safety net, so that the debtor . . . [is] not [left] completely
impoverished” by the collection process.175 Exempt assets aid in a
debtor’s reentry into society as a productive member and prevent
the debtor from becoming destitute and a public charge.176
Although a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide
a means “by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their
affairs, [and] make peace with their creditors,” the Code limits
this “opportunity for . . . ‘the honest but unfortunate debtor.’ ”177
Due to the fresh start’s elevated status in consumer bankruptcy
laws, any practice that hinders exemption entitlements must be
narrowly construed.178

172

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003.
See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 398 (“[T]he fresh start policy
objective . . . animates the consumer bankruptcy system.”).
174
See Sheehan v. Morehead (In re Morehead), 283 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2002);
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995); S & C
Home Loans, Inc. v. Farr (In re Farr), 278 B.R. 171, 175 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002);
Funches v. Household Fin. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Funches), 381 B.R. 471, 491
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008); In re Remington, 311 B.R. 315, 317 (Bankr. D. Me. 2004).
175
See In re Robinson, 292 B.R. 599, 606 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting In re
Sumerell, 194 B.R. 818, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996)).
176
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 115 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6087 (“The historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor
from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute
and a public charge.”).
177
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (citations omitted); see also
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor.’ ” (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87)).
178
See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998).
173
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An indefinite or unannounced adjournment can be equated
with delay and instability, two concepts patently in conflict with
the fresh start. Artificially extending the objection period by
indefinitely continuing the § 341 meeting is a misuse of the
bankruptcy process.179 One commentator, Lawrence Ponoroff,
names three factors that point toward restraining the ability of
the trustee to avoid Rule 4003(b)’s time limitation by continuing
the creditors meeting generally.180 First, the trustee has special
responsibilities to the court and to the bankruptcy system to
act within the letter and spirit of the statute.181
These
responsibilities include examining, investigating, and valuing the
debtor’s assets to facilitate a fresh start in a timely fashion.182
Second, the Code provides several other remedies to discourage
and penalize a debtor who attempts to claim improper
exemptions.183 Finally, although the debtor can move to conclude
the 341 meeting of creditors, there is a fundamental inequality of
available resources, namely knowledge and money, favoring the
trustee.184 Therefore, it is appropriate to utilize the strict
interpretation of Rule 4003(b) adopted in Taylor to focus on a
debtor’s fresh start rather than on improper incentives or abuses
of process.185
2.

Efficient Resolution of Cases and Finality

Economy of administration, another fundamental purpose of
bankruptcy law, has been accorded equal status with the
dual goals of equitable distribution and the fresh start.186 Delay,
along with its inevitable counterpart of uncertainty,
undermines a debtor’s expectations of a financial fresh start and
impairs creditors’ expectations of prompt determination of
distributions.187 Dragging out cases “works to the detriment of
creditors[,] . . . who often prefer to get paid less money with

179

See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 407.
Id. at 408.
181
Id.
182
TRUSTEE HANDBOOK, supra note 49, ¶ 6(A), 6(B)(1).
183
Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 408; see infra Part III.B.
184
Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 408.
185
Id.
186
Superintendent of Ins. for the State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin.
Corp.), 377 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2004); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 advisory
committee’s note; S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970); 93 CONG. REC. 75 (1973).
187
See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 399.
180
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certainty sooner rather than possibly a larger sum later.”188 As
delay ensues, hopes for distribution decrease, and unpaid
creditors are forced to pass on the costs to the consuming
public.189 These creditor losses result in higher interest rates and
lower credit availability to society.190 Unfortunately, these
adverse effects of stalled exemptions on credit markets are
typically borne by the poor, who cannot afford the increased cost
of acquiring credit.191 Therefore, bankruptcy law must balance
“the creditor’s desire to be paid, the debtor’s desire to escape a
burdensome situation, the value society places on having people
pay their debts in full, and the value society places on allowing
debtors to start anew.”192
Thus, Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day
deadline reflects an attempt to strike a proper balance between
providing trustees and creditors with an opportunity to object to
any potentially unlawful exemptions, while simultaneously
assuring the debtor of some sense of finality.193
One of Congress’s objectives in enacting the Code was to
encourage a speedy resolution of cases, thereby reducing delay.194
This stated goal is jeopardized by the practice of indefinite
continuances, which promotes uncertainty and ambiguity
regarding assets. In contrast, the thirty-day time period in Rule
4003(b) advances the general purpose of the Code, which is to

188

Sharfman, supra note 170, at 21.
See Douglas E. Deutsch, Note, Exemption Reform: Examining the Proposals,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 207, 213 (1995).
190
Id.; see also Samuel J. M. Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act:
The Development of Its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of
Consumer-Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 320 (1978) (concluding that a
creditor’s benefit, by surviving bankruptcy or being paid as much as possible, is
often society’s gain); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1427 (1985) (noting that decreasing costs of discharges
threaten to decrease availability of credit and increase costs to borrowers); Judith
Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of
the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 32–33 (1983)
(suggesting that liberal exemption grants by legislatures may lead to reduced
availability of goods and services on credit).
191
Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws,
47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 20 (2004).
192
Deutsch, supra note 189 (quoting Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited,
Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 125 (1982)).
193
See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 599 (E.D. La. 1994).
194
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 490 (1977).
189
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“quickly and effectively . . . settle bankrupt estates.”195 Ignoring
this clear limitation by allowing indefinite delay means “debtors
would remain suspended in limbo awaiting action by the trustee
or creditors to file objections to the debtor’s claim for
exemptions.”196 This result, created by trustees attempting to
circumvent the thirty-day deadline, defies the fundamental
principle that bankruptcy laws in general, and Rule 4003(b) in
particular, were created to efficiently administer debtors’
estates.197
Similarly, the goal of finality is vitally important in securing
both a fresh start and speedy resolution to the debtor’s case.198 In
the exemption process, finality promotes efficiency by
encouraging strict adherence to time-tables for addressing
exemptions and mandating that the issue cannot be reviewed
after the thirty-day deadline has passed. Both debtors and
creditors structure financial decisions in accordance with Code
provisions,199 and any approach carving out an exception to the
text creates uncertainty and chaos. Interpretational variations
regarding a meeting’s conclusion, seen in the three approaches
above, have promoted this uncertainty and unpredictability. The
uncertainty has led to wasteful litigation, which prevents
finality, the fresh start, and any reasonable expectation of a
speedy resolution.200
B.

Plain Meaning and a Holistic Reading of Rule 4003(b) and
Its Counterparts

When interpreting and applying the Code and the Rules,
analysis necessarily begins with the text.201 The Supreme Court
195

Stoulig, 169 B.R. at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re
Robintech, Inc., 863 F.2d 393, 397–98 (5th Cir. 1989)).
196
Id. at 601.
197
Id.
198
Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2365–66 (2009).
199
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][g].
200
Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 399.
201
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The starting point . . . is the
existing statutory text.”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is
to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917))); Gregory E. Maggs, Estoppel and Textualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
167, 171 (2006). Textualism is based on: (1) legislative supremacy and (2) the fact
that legislatures speak only through enacted legislation. Id. Therefore, the words of
the statute are to be the primary basis for determining the statute’s meaning. Id.
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has primarily used strict statutory construction in its bankruptcy
decisions.202 The Bankruptcy Code and Rules necessitate a
narrow, plain meaning reading because of the substantive and
fundamental property rights at stake, which should only be
disturbed on the most irrefutable of grounds: the unequivocal
meaning of the language in the statute.203 Exemptions are vital
to the paramount bankruptcy concept of a “fresh start,”204 and
limitations that impair the fresh start should be tightly
construed.205
Courts should first attempt to use the plain meaning
approach, which analyzes only the text of the statute, in an effort
to enforce its literal meaning.206 On the other hand, if a
particular provision is ambiguous or if there is no specific
provision to govern a particular issue, such as the action required
for “concluding” a creditors meeting, then the courts should
engage in holistic statutory interpretation.207
This process
Textualists consult canons of construction, dictionaries, and other parts of the
legislation in more difficult cases. Id.
202
See Cuevas, supra note 169, at 438–40 (1994); see also Peter H. Carroll, III,
Literalism: The United States Supreme Court’s Methodology for Statutory
Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 144–46 (1993); Thomas
G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 290 (1994). Strictly construing a statute means that application
of the statute is limited to the cases to which the language clearly applies. Id. at 322.
Strict construction is analogous to plain meaning. Id. at 323. In contrast, “liberally”
construing a statute requires an interpretation affording broad and inclusive
application to remedy the broadest set of evils. Id. at 322–23.
203
See Kelch, supra note 202, at 325. The article goes on to say that bankruptcy
law has many characteristics of laws that are strictly construed, such as vested
property rights, debtor-creditor relations, a legislative history full of compromises,
as well as intense interest group pressure. Id. at 323. Furthermore, because the
Code affects fundamental rights in and to property, it should be treated differently
from other remedial statutes that are typically liberally construed. Id. at 325.
Because bankruptcy law substantively affects the property rights of both debtors
and creditors, it is fitting that the Code be interpreted as dislodging those rights
only when the statute unequivocally states so. Id.
204
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant the debtor a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest
but unfortunate debtor.’ ” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)));
Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005) (“To help the debtor obtain a fresh
start, the Bankruptcy Code permits him to withdraw from the estate certain
interests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values.”).
205
See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (referring to the “ ‘wellknown’ guide that exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly
expressed’ ” (citations omitted)).
206
Cuevas, supra note 169, at 438.
207
Id.
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promotes predictability,208 and it prevents bankruptcy judges
from using their equitable powers to create substantive
entitlements that are not specifically authorized by the Code.209
The holistic approach focuses on the Rules promulgated by
the Court and enacted by Congress and views them in light of the
structure of the Code as a whole, seeking a determination that is
compatible with the entire statutory scheme.210 When engaging
in a holistic endeavor of statutory construction, the relevant
provisions of the Code and Rules must be construed together and
harmonized to divine a congressional intent that effectuates the
purpose of the legislative enactment.211 Statutes should be read
as giving effect to each word, clause, and sentence, and if the
provision is susceptible to various meanings, the construction
adopted should advance the overall statutory policy.212 Thus,
ascertaining the congressional intent for when a 341 meeting
concludes requires a natural reading of § 522 and the relevant
Rules and selecting an interpretation that is consistent with the
entire statutory scheme.
Rule 4003(b), working in tandem with § 522(l), governs the
procedures for claiming and objecting to exemptions. The Rule
sets a deadline for objections to prevent an open-ended
continuation of the meeting and to discourage parties from
sleeping on their rights and then swooping in months or years

208
See also Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court’s
Evolving “Plain Meaning” Approach to Bankruptcy Juriprudence, 23 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1636, 1639 (1993). A plain meaning approach to interpretation is the best route
for certainty and predictability when structuring commercial transactions. Kelch,
supra note 202, at 329. Plain meaning interpretation is said to be better than a
policy-based analysis because it provides the greatest degree of accuracy and clarity.
Id.
209
Cuevas, supra note 169, at 439.
210
Id.; see also United Saving Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1998). The Court based its decision on its interpretation
of different Code sections because no particular Code provision addressed the issue.
Id.
211
See Carroll, supra note 202, at 151–52. The article espouses the Supreme
Court’s “new literalism” tactic employed in Ron Pair, which emphasizes a statute’s
“intrinsic construction” through a rigorous examination of statutory text, structure,
composition, and relationship to other statutes. Id. at 151. The analysis requires
consideration of the grammatical structure of the statute, the use of particular
words in the same statute, and the language as part of a comprehensive statutory
scheme. Id.
212
Id. at 151–52.
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later to protest the debtor’s exemption.213 By writing a deadline,
and a short one at that, the Rule indicates an attempt to bring an
end to the objection process in order to move the ultimate
discharge process forward.214
Significantly, Rule 2003(e) provides the trustee with
virtually unlimited control over the objection process. The Rule
provides that “[t]he meeting may be adjourned from time to time
by announcement at the meeting of the adjourned date and time
without further written notice.”215 A natural reading of the Rule
indicates that the trustee has discretion to adjourn the meeting
but that the trustee lacks discretion regarding the announcement
of a specific future date and time at the meeting.216 Though the
statute’s language is plain, and thus, must be enforced according
to its terms,217 courts have interpreted the language of the Rule
permissively, finding that the trustee “may,” but is not required
to, announce a future date and time at the meeting. This liberal
construction gives the trustee unfettered discretion to adjourn
the meeting and leaves the debtor guessing as to when and if it
will be reconvened. This construction also impedes the cohesive
and fast-paced framework designed to resolve individual debtors’
cases within a short timeframe. When viewed in light of the
statutory scheme providing for case resolution within 124 days,
an interpretation allowing an indefinite continuance in order to
circumvent the Rules is manifestly unreasonable.

213
See In re Peterman, 358 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (following the
expiration of the thirty-day deadline, the debtor can treat exempted property as his
own and is not forced to wait until some unknown future date, when the trustee
might haul the debtor into court seeking that property).
214
Id.
215
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e) (emphasis added).
216
In addition, the trustee has the option of requesting an extension of the
thirty-day period if the request is made within the original thirty-day period. Id.
4003(b)(1).
217
See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1,
6 (2000).

CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:13 PM

2010]

C.

TICK TOCK

1535

Equitable Considerations, Strict Statutory Construction, and
§ 105

Section 105(a) gives the bankruptcy court broad equitable
powers to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.”218 It further states:
No provision of the [the Bankruptcy Code] providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce
or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process.219

Despite its seemingly boundless language, § 105 may only be
used in furtherance of other sections of the Code and cannot be
used to expand judicial power or conflict with other statutes.220
Accordingly, § 105 does not provide for open-ended adjournments
in derogation of the policy of finality underlying the Code.
Moreover, although bankruptcy courts have been called courts of
equity,221 § 105 is “not a roving commission to do equity.”222
Therefore, courts cannot create remedies or override provisions
in derogation of the stated limits present in the Code and
Rules.223
For example, in Coie v. Sadkin (In re Sadkin), where a
creditor missed the explicit thirty-day deadline and belatedly
filed an objection, using § 105 to sustain the objection was held to
be inconsistent with the operation of § 522(l), Rule 4003(b), and
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these provisions.224 The
218
See Nicholas B. Malito, Recent Developments: Section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 363, 363 (2009)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006)).
219
11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 2011); see also Malito, supra note 218.
220
See id.
221
See Edith H. Jones, The Bankruptcy Galaxy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 269, 270–71
(1999) (“Approaching bankruptcy from the standpoint of a law court instead of an
equity court may, in my view, lead to a more even balance between debtors’ and
creditors’ rights.”).
222
Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Nosek (In re Nosek), 544 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2008);
see also Jones, supra note 221.
223
See Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir.
2008); Mazon v. Tardif, 395 B.R. 742, 749 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that § 105(a)
may not be used in a manner inconsistent with other, more specific provisions of the
Code and that a bankruptcy court may not read additional exceptions or remedies
into the statutory provisions of the Code); Malito, supra note 218, at 365.
224
36 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1994).
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reasoning was that § 105 does not empower the court to override
explicit mandates of other Code sections.225 Realistically, the
potential prejudice to creditors is remedied by the Code and
Rules’ various provisions discouraging debtors from making
claims lacking merit.226
Additionally, strict statutory construction limits a
bankruptcy court’s ability to utilize equitable considerations to
evade the clear language in the statute.227 If a court were
empowered to use equity to disregard the text of statutes, then
carefully-crafted legislation would be meaningless and the “rule
of law would be eviscerated.”228 If a court were allowed to
consider the relative equities of a decision, such as the
reasonableness of the trustee or the complexity of a case, it would
produce havoc and decrease predictability.229 Because the court’s
decision would not be based upon the plain meaning of the text,
parties could not plan their transactions with certainty because
the outcome might vary depending on the particular judge’s
sense of fairness.230 Strict statutory construction constrains a
court’s equitable powers by favoring the certainty and
predictability embodied within the dictates of the Code.231 Thus,
the correct interpretation of Rule 4003(b) focuses on the
principles of finality, expeditious administration, and a fresh
start, rather than on equitable considerations of prejudice to
creditors from narrowly construed deadlines.232
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A.

Revision Requiring Action

A law that effectively implements the policies animating the
Code and Rules must strike a balance between the perennial
conflict surrounding debtors and creditors. Therefore, resolving
ambiguity in the “conclusion” of a meeting must accommodate
225

Id. at 478.
See infra Part III.B.
227
See Cuevas, supra note 169, at 466.
228
Id.
229
See id. at 467.
230
See id.
231
See id.
232
See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 410–11; see also Effross, supra note 208
(explaining that the literal reading of the Code increases predictability in
bankruptcy decisions and decreases the volume of litigation).
226
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the debtor’s need for a fresh start, the creditors’ right to equitable
distribution, and the shared goals of expeditious and efficient
administration of the estate. This Note advocates that Rule
4003(b) be revised to require that unless the trustee, “for cause,”
announces the future date and time of the adjourned meeting at
the 341 meeting of creditors, the thirty-day period begins as of
the last date of the 341 meeting.
This approach fosters the fresh start, promotes speedy
resolution, creates certainty, and advances a sense of finality, yet
provides the trustee and creditors with the opportunity to object
at the meeting based on the particular circumstances. The
flexible “for cause” requirement considers the motives and
strategies of all the parties by allowing an adjournment for a
legitimate reason, yet proscribes adjournment tactics that result
in unnecessary delay. The “for cause” requirement thus prohibits
the trustee from extending the duration of the case for no reason
but also allows for objections when the debtor has not acted
appropriately or legitimate concerns remain about the debtor’s
finances.
Requiring “cause” for adjourning the 341 meeting is
consistent with current Rule 4003(b), which requires a party to
show cause on a motion for an extension of time after the
meeting has concluded. Rule 4003(b) states: “The court may, for
cause, extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to
object expires, a party in interest files a request for an
extension.”233 The cause requirement was specifically added to
Rule 4003(b) in the 2000 amendments but was not defined by the
Rules.234 The “for cause” requirement found in Rules 4004(b) and
4007(c) has not been interpreted as “just because I ask,” but
rather as a showing of good reason why an extension should be
granted.235 Since there is no explicit definition of “cause”
anywhere in the Code or Rules, the determination is left to
judicial interpretation.236

233

FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (emphasis added).
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 advisory committee’s note; see also In re Booth,
259 B.R. 413, 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
235
See In re Garner, 339 B.R. 610, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
236
See In re Stonham, 317 B.R. 544, 547 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004).
234
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What constitutes “cause” is fact specific, taking into
consideration the circumstances of each case but also placing
Many courts have
restraints on the trustee’s actions.237
interpreted “cause” to mean that the trustee or creditor must
demonstrate a reasonable degree of due diligence to receive the
requested extension of time.238 Several factors that aid in the
determination of showing cause include (1) whether the debtor
refused in bad faith to cooperate with the creditor; (2) whether
the creditor has sufficient notice of the deadline and the
information to file an objection; (3) the possibility that the
proceedings pending in another forum will result in collateral
estoppel on the relevant issues; (4) whether the creditor exercised
diligence; and (5) the complexity of the case.239
For example, in In re Booth, when the debtor converted her
case from chapter 13 to chapter 7, “cause” for an extension
existed in order to give the trustee the opportunity to review and
object to the claimed exemptions.240 “Cause” also existed when
the debtor failed to respond to formal discovery requests, but the
court did not grant more time when a debtor failed to respond to
informal requests.241 Additionally, “cause” could be shown by
simply noting the claim’s failure to establish the debtor’s
entitlement to the exemption sought or the claim’s failure to
identify the property claimed.242 Though there is no precise
definition of what constitutes “cause,” reasonable concern
regarding the legitimacy of claimed exemptions, made at the 341
meeting of creditors or in the thirty days following, would
probably suffice for an extension of time.
237

See id. at 547–48; In re Molitor, 395 B.R. 197, 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008).
See In re Stonham, 317 B.R. at 547 (finding that if “cause” must be shown,
“then the Court does not agree that the movant’s burden of proof can be satisfied
with only a scintilla of evidence”).
239
See In re Ballas, 342 B.R. 853, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
240
See In re Booth, 259 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that
“cause” for extending deadline for objecting to exemptions existed when debtor
converted from one chapter to another in order to give trustee time to review
exemptions and to prevent potential abuse).
241
See In re Carlson, 380 B.R. 906, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that
informal discovery requests made in June 2007, without further filing formal
requests, were not legally sufficient showings of “cause” for granting further
extensions of deadlines in January 2008).
242
See Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 171 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the trustee should have made a “for cause” motion based on the debtor’s
withholding of information and thereby saved much time and uncertainty for all
parties).
238
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This proposed revision prohibits the trustee from dodging
the thirty-day deadline and undermining the framework and
policies underlying consumer bankruptcies. The bright line,
case-by-case, and debtor’s burden approaches have all proved
unworkable and, instead of quickly resolving cases, have made
the process slower and more protracted. Logically, Rule 4003(b)
was promulgated to provide a deadline because the Court and
Congress expected that deadline to begin running early in the
case. Allowing the trustee additional time in the absence of
special circumstances contravenes the values reflected in the
Code and thwarts both debtors’ and creditors’ expectations of a
prompt resolution.
The Code and the Rules have intentionally adopted a
framework in which individual chapter 7 cases are almost always
concluded within four months.243
Within that timeframe,
individual debtors should acquire some clarity and security
regarding their finances on a going-forward basis. Early on in
the case, a debtor makes substantial disclosures about his or her
finances and is questioned by the trustee at the creditors meeting
and therefore, deserves to be on notice of any objections to the
listed exemptions. The approaches adopted above, particularly
the case-by-case and debtor’s burden, suggest that a debtor’s
finances, future prospects, and ability to use property claimed as
exempt must remain in limbo while the trustee decides whether
and when to reconvene the meeting. As a practical concern, as
time progresses, debtors will not have even been put on notice
about whether their car, home, furnishings, clothes, tools of the
trade, and other items will later be turned over to the trustee.
By requiring the trustee to announce a definite future meeting
date at the current meeting or risk losing the authority to,
debtors can begin to reasonably restructure their affairs with
some certainty as to what they still own. The Code and Rules act
together to set forth a framework pushing chapter 7 cases to
conclusion in four months and require that objections be filed

243
See Discharge in Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.
gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/discharge.html#when (last visited Feb. 11,
2011) (stating on the Federal Judiciary’s “Bankruptcy Basics” that “typically, [a
chapter 7 discharge is granted] about four months after the date the debtor files the
petition”). See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2011); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007,
4003(a).
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within just thirty days of the last 341 creditors meeting.
Permitting trustee’s unfettered discretion to prevent this
deadline from ever beginning is irrational.
B.

The Code Provides Numerous Other Remedies for Protection
of Creditors

Tension exists between the debtor’s interest in a fresh start
and the trustee’s duties to catch abusive exemptions in a limited
time frame. Critics of Taylor and the bright line approach
suggest that an open ended construction of Rules 4003(b) and
2003(e) is necessary to prevent abusive debtors who list
erroneous exemptions in the hopes that the trustee will not
notice in time.244 This proposed solution, however, clarifies the
intended thrust of the Rules: “If a trustee needs further
information in order to decide whether to object to an exemption,
the trustee should either continue the section 341 meeting to a
definite date or seek an extension of time to file objections to the
exemption.”245 Under this approach, if the trustee does not catch
an improper exemption at the 341 meeting, he or she still has
thirty days to move for an extension of time to investigate.246
In 2008, Rule 4003(b) was amended to create an exception to
the thirty-day deadline in cases where a debtor fraudulently
claimed an exemption.247 The Rule provides: “The trustee may
file an objection to a claim of exemption at any time prior to one
year after the closing of the case if the debtor fraudulently
asserted the claim of exemption.”248 The Advisory Committee
Notes demonstrates that the revised Rule was designed to
resolve the very situation with which critics are concerned:
“Extending the deadline for trustees to object to an exemption
when the exemption claim has been fraudulently made will
permit the court to review and, in proper circumstances, deny
improperly claimed exemptions, thereby protecting the legitimate
interests of creditors and the bankruptcy estate.”249

244
245
246
247
248
249

See, e.g., Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008).
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][g].
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
Id. 4003(b)(2).
Id.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 advisory committee’s note.
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Notably, in 2009, only thirteen individual debtors out of the
1.4 million who filed were convicted of bankruptcy fraud.250 To
the very limited extent exemption fraud exists, this added
safeguard assuages the critics’ fear of debtor fraud.251
The possibility of debtors making groundless exemption
claims with impunity is an insufficient reason to render the
deadline for objections meaningless in light of the numerous
Code provisions discouraging abuse. Section 727, the discharge
statute for chapter 7 bankruptcies, contains a number of
provisions authorizing denial of discharge for fraud or abuse of
the system. Overall, pursuant to § 727, if the debtor knowingly
or fraudulently hindered, delayed, falsified, or concealed with
respect to any property or process of the administration, he or
she will be denied discharge.252 In addition, § 152 of Title 18
imposes criminal penalties for concealing assets and making
false oaths and claims.253
In addition to the Code, the Rules also serve to limit bad
faith claims of exemptions by debtors. Rule 9011 authorizes
sanctions for signing certain documents not “well grounded in
fact” and “warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”254
Similarly, Rule 1008 requires all filings to be “verified or contain
an unsworn declaration” of truthfulness under penalty of
perjury.255
These significant provisions help ensure that
adequate and accurate information is provided in all filings made
in chapter 7 consumer cases.

250
See Bankruptcy Fraud—Criminal Investigation (CI), IRS, http://www.irs.
gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=117520,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011);
Statistical
Data—Bankruptcy
Fraud,
IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement/article/0,,id=118207,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
251
Realistically, this exception may be of little use to creditors. 9 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, ¶ 4003.03[1][b]. “Once a case is closed, a trustee is not
likely to spend further time considering the debtor’s assets.” Id. This is especially so
considering that “the trustee is discharged before the case is closed and would have
to seek reappointment.” Id.
252
See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006).
253
See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
254
11 U.S.C.A. § 707 (West 2011).
255
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008.
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CONCLUSION
The solution proposed in this Note—which requires
announcement of the date and time of a future meeting at the
current meeting—fosters the expeditious, efficient, and
responsible administration of a chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy
case. The proposal harmonizes the competing desires of debtors
and creditors by providing a means to resolve disputes early on
so both parties can move forward. By requiring the trustee to
declare a new meeting or risk losing the authority to do so,
this proposal accords with the comprehensive statutory design
mandated by the Code and Rules.
Any practice that
unnecessarily extends the objection period contravenes the fresh
start policy embedded in the Code’s exemption provisions and
denies the honest, but unfortunate, debtor a chance for financial
rebirth.

